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IMPLIED COVENANTS BETWEEN ASSIGNORS AND
ASSIGNEES OF OIL AND GAS LEASES:
POLICY AND PRECEDENT
by Michael D. Salim
Implied covenants between lessors and lessees of oil and gas leases have
been institutionalized through statute and through precedent. In compari-
son, however, these same covenants have not widely been found implicit
between assignors and assignees of oil and gas leases. This Comment, while
emphasizing Texas common law in part II, has as its purposes the general
exposition of implied covenants and the explanation of why these covenants
should not be implied between assignors and assignees of oil and gas leases.
I. JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF IMPLIED COVENANTS
The law of oil and gas has had a practical and problematical evolution.' In
the early stages, oil and gas ownership was a mutable concept: courts often
formulated their judgments without clearly understanding the physical prop-
erties of the minerals.2 Two principal theories of ownership, qualified and
absolute, emerged.3 As the migratory propensity of the oil and gas became
more evident, the earliest possessor stood to gain the most.4 The landowner,
however, was often of limited resources, or if he had the capital to finance
drilling and production, he was likely to lack the requisite geological or
engineering talents. These individual inadequacies, coupled with the over-
arching speculativeness of discovery, led to many innovations in oil and gas
law designed to minimize the risks of production and to shift expenses to
others.
I. See generally 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 801 (1975); Summers,
Legal Rights Against Drainage of Oil and Gas, 18 TEXAS L. REV. 27 (1939); Comment, Liability
in Texas for Wrongful Drainage of Oil and Gas, 27 TEXAS L. REV. 349, 350-52 (1949); 43 TEX.
JUR. 2d Oil & Gas § 418 (1963).
2. See Summers, supra note 1.
3. See Walker, Property Rights in Oil and Gas and Their Effect upon Police Regulation of
Production, 16 TEXAS L. REV. 370, 371-73 (1938). Under the qualified ownership model, all
landowners over the mineral reservoir have co-extensive ownership and possessory rights to
the oil and gas mined; collective rights are provided for because of the migratory nature of the
minerals. See also Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190 (1900); Bell Corp. v. Bell View Oil
Syndicate, 24 Cal. App. 2d 587, 76 P.2d 167 (1938). Texas adheres to the absolute theory
whereby a surface landowner owns individually all the oil and gas to be found below his land.
See also Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 113 Tex. 160, 254 S.W. 290 (1923);
Texas Co. v. Daugherty, 107 Tex. 226, 176 S.W. 717 (1915).
4. See Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utils. Corp., 300 U.S. 55 (1937); Champlin Ref.
Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210 (1932).
Borrowing on the rule of capture of wild animals, the courts applied a similar theory to the
subsurface minerals. See Hardwicke, The Rule of Capture and Its Implications as Applied to
Oil and Gas, 13 TEXAS L. REV. 391 (1935). The drainage from other land which often
accompanied the capture was not early guarded against, by producers or by courts. See Kelly v.
Ohio Oil Co., 57 Ohio St. 317, 49 N.E. 399 (1897); Barnard v. Monongahela Natural Gas Co.,
216 Pa. 362, 65 A. 801 (1907).
5. See 43 TEX. JUR. 2D Oil & Gas § 418 (1963); Jackson, Federal Income Tax Problems
Involved in Typical Oil and Gas Transactions in Texas, 25 TEXAS L. REV. 343 (1947).
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A practice particularly attractive to the landowner in fund raising or in
acquiring expertise was to sever the surface and mineral interests through
the execution of a lease.6 The instrument's terms generally would authorize
an exclusive right of exploitation of the oil and gas for the lessee and would
retain for the lessor a royalty7 to be paid in the event that oil or gas was
discovered and produced.8 Beyond the general provisions for the lessor's
compensation and for the lessee's rights of production, the lease terms were
usually more procedural than substantive. 9 In essence, the lessee in drafting
the lease for the landowner's signature possessed a decided advantage"0
under the express duties of the agreement."
A. Policy Evoking Implication
Although lease agreements normally contain specific provisions for the
payment of oil royalties or gas well rentals, covenants to perform those acts
necessarily antecedent to the creation of the legal obligation to pay the
royalty are not always expressly enumerated. The financial interests which
undergird the lessor's royalty compensation, that is, the development and
marketing of a profitable oil or gas well, would appear to be those of the
lessee as well. A more searching analysis, however, compels the conclusion
that prompt capture may not always be the lessee's primary economic
objective. Frequently, 2 the lessor has arranged to obtain the major portion
of his remuneration through the royalty on the produced oil and gas; as a
result, "anxious" understates the landowner's anticipation of exploration,
development, operation, and marketing stages of the producing process.
The lessee, on the other hand, pursues a more guarded advancement.
Through a lease, the lessee, an expert in comparison to the surface owner,
has assumed the risk of frustration. When viewed in these terms, the lessee
6. See generally M. MERRILL, COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS LEASES § I (2d ed.
1940); H. WILLIAMS, R. MAXWELL & C. MEYERS, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS 139-297 (2d ed.
1964); 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 1, § 202.
7. "The term 'royalty' in the strict sense is held to mean a share of the product or the
proceeds therefrom, reserved to the owner for permitting another to use the property." H.
WILLIAMS, R. MAXWELL & C. MEYERS, supra note 6, at 406. In applying the principle of
"royalty" to oil and gas, however, commentators narrow its scope: a royalty is "that portion of
the oil produced for which the lessee must account to the lessor under the terms of the lease,
exclusive of oil payments but inclusive of excess or overriding landowner's royalty." Id. See
also I E. BROWN, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS LEASES § 6.00 (2d ed. 1973); 3A W. SUMMERS, THE
LAW OF OIL AND GAS §§ 571-572, 583, 590 (perm. ed. 1958).
8. See M. MERRILL, supra note 6, § I, at 16.
9. Id. §5.
10. See note 24 infra and accompanying text.
11. Though the immediate concern here is with the implication of lease rights and duties,
the express covenants have an indirectly relevant effect on the implied terms. In Carper v.
United Fuel Gas Co., 78 W. Va. 433, 89 S.E. 12 (1916), this basic rule was handed down: "An
implication cannot stand against an express agreement. In so far as it is inconsistent with the
terms of the agreement, it [the implication] must yield." Care, however, should be utilized in
not reading this principle too broadly. In the narrowest sense, the court held only that an
implied covenant is precluded only where an express term, dealing with the same subject
matter, has been asserted. For a discussion of the assimilation and evolution of the express oil
and gas lease provisions see Veasey, The Law of Oil and Gas (pts. 2-4), 18 MICH. L. REV. 652,
652-72, 749, 749-73 (1920), 19 MICH. L. REV. 161 (1920), and Walker, The Nature of the Property
Interests Created by an Oil and Gas Lease in Texas, 7 TEXAS L. REV. 1, 10-49 (1928).
12. The exception may be the situation in which the landowner has contracted to receive
large delay rentals, paid by the lessee, the operator of the working interest, for the privilege of
preventing the lease from lapsing or of shielding himself from breach. See M. MERRILL, supra
note 6, §§ 22-28.
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may prefer to sit on his lease interest, using it instead for speculation or as a
reserve for postponed exploitation. 3 Even if the field is a proven producer,
the lessee may find his interests best served by the exercise of discretion
before plunging headlong into full-scale production, despite the lessor's
preferences. By waiting, the chance of an enhanced price may reflect a more
profitable investment.
Given these conjectural, though practical conflicts of interest, the adher-
ence of the courts to the policy of avoiding the insertion of contractual terms
upon which the parties have not agreed, 4 i.e., the implication of covenants,
is difficult to explain. Dilatoriness is not an impasse, however, and the
justifications for implication of additional duties impelled action.' 5 As the
law developed, courts, seeking to justify their own intrusions into the realm
of implied covenants, 6 and commentators, giving impetus to their argu-
ments, 7 could claim a common law recognition of rights and duties beyond
those expressly recorded in the oil and gas lease.
Slow in its coming, 8 the discovery of the "evident" truth of the implied
oil and gas lease covenant was not without policy underpinnings. 9 First,
land ownership in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was that
of an agricultural society2" in which land titles were generally of small
acreage.2 Moreover, these title holders were often deficient in finances,
13. Id. § 1, at 17
14. 3 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 561, at 279-80 (1960).
15. The doctrine of implied covenants did not receive its official upstart until the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, in a case involving an express clause to develop, asserted through
dictum that in the absence of the specific development provision "there would of course have
arisen an implication that the property should be developed reasonably, and evidence of a
custom of reasonable development by boring a given number of wells in a certain space of time
would have been competent and perhaps controlling." Stoddard v. Emery, 128 Pa. 436, 18 A.
339, 339 (1889). See also M. MERRILL, supra note 6, § 10, at 40-41, where he finds the legal
groundwork for the Stoddard decision laid in two earlier Pennsylvania cases, Bradford Oil Co.
v. Blair, 113 Pa. 83, 4 A. 218 (1886), and Brown v. Vandergrift, 80 Pa. 142 (1875).
The leading case in the evolution of the lessor-lessee implied covenant principle is, however,
Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 F. 801 (8th Cir. 1905). There, Judge Van Devanter found an
implied obligation on the lessee's part to drill a test well. His reasoning was in terms of contract
law: "Whatever is implied in a contract is as effectual as what is expressed. Implication is but
another name for intention, and if it arises from the language of the contract when considered in
its entirety, and is not gathered from the mere expectations of one or both of the parties, it is
controlling." Id. at 809. The import of Brewster was not solely confined to a specific holding
for the implication of a lessor-lessee covenant; the test for determining whether the duty has
been breached was also enunciated: the exercise of "reasonable diligence for the common
benefit of the parties." Id. at 810.
16. See Hall v. South Penn Oil Co., 71 W. Va. 82, 76 S.E. 124 (1912). The forerunner Texas
decision is that of Emery v. League, 72 S.W. 603 (Tex. Civ. App. 1903, writ ref'd) (implied
covenant to use reasonable diligence in exploration and development).
17. For a discussion of the innovation of the implied covenant doctrine in other juris-
dictions see M. MERRILL, supra note 6, §§ 11-13, at 44-47; 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra
note 1, § 801, at 1-3.
18. Even under the most generous of calculations, the time interval between the first oil
discovery near Titusville, Pennsylvania, in 1859 and that state's announcement of the doctrine
of implied covenants, see note 15 supra, reflects either recalcitrance or obscurity.
19. See generally M. MERRILL, supra note 6, § 221; 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra
note 1, § 801, at 1-2, §§ 802.1-803.
20. See A. DAVIS & H. WOODMAN, CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS IN MODERN AMERICAN
HISTORY 47-49 (3d ed. 1972); 2 A. DECONDE, A. RAPPAPORT & W. STECKEL, PATrERNS IN
AMERICAN HISTORY I (3d ed. 1973); Diamond, The Impact of Industrialization on American
Society, in 2 MAIN PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 27-28 (3d ed. 1972).
21. See Diamond, supra note 20, at 28.
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sophistication, and expertise.22 Consequently, the market was ripe for the
taking.23 The would-be lessors, when approached by oil producers offering
rich returns on investments without daily backbreaking labor, were prompt
in accession. In all fairness, however, the ordinary landowner was equipped
with faculties sufficient to look after his own general interests: most were
farsighted enough to bargain for a royalty. Nonetheless, irrespective of
whether the lessee, drafting the lease instrument or filling in the blanks on
prepared forms, considered possible omissions, the lessor was usually not
educated in the peculiarities of oil and gas, nor in the law relating to the
lessee's liabilities.24 As a result, the lessor, needing exploration and pro-
duction in order to realize the benefit of his contract, could rely only on the
good faith of the lessee since the express covenants were restrictive of his
legal recourse.
The second policy argument advanced, though correlative to the unequal
bargaining notion, does not depend upon subjective aspects to the same
extent as the first. The very nature of the oil and gas lease does not easily
lend itself to expressly denominated terms.25 The lessee must be given
latitude to pursue profitable production; as owner of the working interest, he
cannot be tied down to minute detail owing to the shifted risk and to the
speculativeness of the industry.26 At best providing a legal framework, the
lease could contain only generalizations which a court might be called upon
to interpret. By recognizing implied covenants rather than by interpreting
ambiguities, the need for litigation may not be diminished, but at least the
lessor's protection under the implication principle will not depend solely
upon the construction of vague contractual provisions, if so found.27 Conse-
quently, notwithstanding similar transactions in other businesses, the oil and
gas lease cannot be intended to stabilize expectations.
A final policy rationale, of limited utility in the broader analysis, for
implied lessor-lessee covenants is attributed to that legalistic "kitchen
sink," the public interest in the outcome of the controversy. Commentators
have averred that some controversies should also be subject to circum-
stances surrounding the immediate leasing transaction and the relationship
which it creates.28 In an era of tension between conservation regulations and
critical demand, the further tension between the lessor and lessee of the oil
and gas lease is counterproductive. Thus, the public interest in oil and gas
should be included in the balancing formula before such major covenants as
those of exploration, development, and operation are implied.29
22. See notes 5-9 supra and accompanying text.
23. See M. MERRILL, supra note 6, § 221, at 466-67; 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra
note 1, § 801, at 2.
24. See M. MERRILL, supra note 6, § 221, at 466.
25. See 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 1, § 801, at 2.
26. Id. at II.
27. See generally 3 A. CORBIN, supra note 14, §§ 561-562. For recognition of the relation-
ship between basic contract principles and oil and gas rules see 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS,
supra note 1, § 802.1, at 8.
28. See 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 1, § 802.2, at 12.
29. This balancing of the public interest parallels the treatment given to other scarce
resources. Id. at 13.
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B. Classification of Implied Covenants
To this point, only an occasional mention has been made as to the kinds of
covenants which have been implied. The reason for this is to emphasize the
implied covenants' policy bases, not to stress their nomenclature or to
create an artificial suspense in the reader's mind. Legal labels from their
incipiency are aribitrary unless supported by jurisdictional consensus. Such
unanimity is not to be found in either the federal or the state systems, much
less among the commentators who have pondered and argued the courts'
judgments." That the categories of implied covenants have grown out of
specific factual arrangements is a product of organizational convenience and
workability.3 Care should, however, be exercised so as to avoid immersion
in the technicalities of description, and thereby to relinquish a hold on the
more comprehensive theory which underlies the implied covenants: all
claims of improper operation should be measured against the requirement
that the lessee conduct his operations in an ordinary, reasonable, and pru-
dent manner which effectuates the purposes of the lease.32
Within this standard of reasonableness, Professors Howard Williams and
Charles Meyers 33 classify their six implied covenants.34 The first implied
term is that of drilling an initial exploratory well. For the most part, howev-
er, the occasions for implication of the test-well covenant are diminishing
since leases generally provide for it expressly. Secondly, a covenant is
implied that the lessee protect the leasehold from drainage by drilling offset
30. In perhaps the leading composite exposition of the law of implied covenants Professor
Maurice Merrill classifies as follows:
I. The implied covenant to drill an exploratory well.
II. The implied covenant to drill additional wells.
III. The implied covenant for diligent and proper operation of the wells and for
marketing the product, if oil and gas is discovered in paying quantities.
IV. The implied covenant to protect the leased premises against drainage by
wells on adjoining land.
M. MERRILL, supra note 6, § 4, at 23.
An equally knowledgeable authority, Professor A.W. Walker, Jr., likewise categorized by
four:
(1) the covenant to develop the premises with reasonable diligence;
(2) the covenant to protect the premises against drainage by using reasonable
diligence in drilling offset wells;
(3) the covenant to use reasonable diligence in producing the oil and in market-
ing or utilizing the gas; and
(4) the covenant to use reasonable care in conducting all operations affecting
the lessor's royalty interest.
Walker, The Nature of the Property Interests Created by an Oil and Gas Lease in Texas, 11
TEXAS L. REV. 399, 401 (1933). In contrast to Professor Merrill, Professor Walker abandoned
the duty to drill an exploratory well; he stressed the reasonable diligence standard more, and he
divided the operation and marketing covenant.
Compare also the different implied covenants found in 2 E. BROWN, supra note 7, § 16.02; R.
HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS 365 (1971); 2 W. SUMMERS, supra note 7, § 395 (perm.
ed. 1959).
31. See 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 1, § 804, at 21.
32. Id. at 21-22. For a consideration of the prudent-operator theory see note 15 supra.
Significance should also be attached to the fact that the broad language of the prudent-operator
standard would easily embrace the implication of additional lease covenants.
33. It is not the design here to adopt one classification scheme over any other. The
categories of Williams and Meyers were more readily used in illustration because of the late
date of their publication and of the treatise's national outlook. Compare classification schemes
of sources cited in note 30 supra with those of note 34 infra and the accompanying text.
34. The textual analysis accorded the six covenants is paraphrastic. For a verbatim treat-
ment see 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 1, § 804, at 26-27.
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wells, where such wells would be drilled by a prudent operator, i.e., would
return a profit to the lessee over the drilling, equipping, and producing
expenses. Once a producing formation is discovered, the next covenant to
be implied is that of reasonable development. The purpose of this "addition-
al wells" covenant is to assure a reasonable production rate and the mining
of all recoverable subsurface minerals.36 The authors then advise implication
of a covenant to explore further, the object here being distinct from that of
the reasonable development covenant in that the drilling contemplated is
done in areas which contain potentially productive, rather than producing,
formations.37 The fifth classification is one of marketing. Most of the con-
troversy regarding this covenant centers not on its existence, but on the
standard to be applied in measuring the lessee's conformity.3" The covenant
to perform with reasonable care and due diligence all operations on the
leasehold that affect the lessor's royalty interest comprises the final cate-
gory. This implied provision overlaps those of drilling, producing, and
marketing, and its breach may give rise to causes of action in contract or
tort.
C. Methods of Implication
Courts have fashioned two primary approaches for the implication of
covenants. Certain jurisdictions have borrowed from solid-mineral law,
while others, more realistically, have extended the implied-in-fact or im-
plied-in-law remedial concepts.
Solid-Mineral Law. The law of the United States dealing with solid miner-
als like coal and the metal ores was first codified, so far as it had then
developed, at about the time that oil and gas production was gathering
impetus. 9 As with oil and gas landowners,' the surface owners of land
studded with deposits of solid minerals early discovered the lease agreement
to be an effective means of extraction and sale at a price vastly in excess of
35. See, e.g., Brimmer v. Union Oil Co., 81 F.2d 457 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 668
(1936); Denker v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 56 F.2d 725 (10th Cir. 1932); Indian Territo-
ry Illuminating Oil Co. v. Rosamond, 190 Okla. 46, 120 P.2d 349 (1941). See also Annot., 138
A.L.R. 246 (1942); Annot., 105 A.L.R. 454 (1936); Annot., 84 A.L.R. 756 (1933).
36. See note 30 supra.
37. The implied covenant to drill addtional wells is unique to Professors Williams and
Meyers. See sources cited in note 30 supra. The courts have hesitated in implying such a
covenant because of the potentially disastrous effect it would have on the petroleum industry.
For example, the implied covenant to drill additional wells would allow lessors to designate
depths or locations of drilling which were beyond the scope of negotiations between the lease
parties. See, e.g., Clifton v. Koontz, 160 Tex. 82, 325 S.W.2d 684 (1959); Felmont Oil Corp. v.
Pan American Petroleum Corp., 334 S.W.2d 449 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1960, writ ref'd
n.r.e.). Contra, Sinclair Oil & Gas Co. v. Masterson, 271 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1959), recognized as
overruled, Weymouth v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 367 F.2d 84, 102 n.57 (5th Cir. 1966).
38. See, e.g., Matzen v. Hugoton Prod. Co., 182 Kan. 456, 321 P.2d 576 (1958); McVicker
v. Horn, Robinson & Nathan, 322 P.2d 410 (Okla. 1958); Cole Petroleum Co. v. United States
Gas & Oil Co., 121 Tex. 59, 41 S.W.2d 414 (1931). See also Annot., 71 A.L.R.2d 1219 (1960);
Annot., 86 A.L.R. 725 (1933).
39. A section of the Mining Law of 1866 officially declared that "the mineral lands of the
public domain, both surveyed and unsurveyed, are hereby . . . free and open to exploration
and occupation .... " 14 Stat. 251 (1866). For a discussion of mining laws in America and their
evolution see 1 THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL LAW FOUNDATION, THE AMERICAN LAW OF
MINING §§ 1.1-.47 (1976).
40. See notes 1-5 supra and accompanying text.
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that to be derived from conveyance of the fee simple." Also in keeping with
the landowner's oil and gas counterpart,4 2 the solid mineral lessor demon-
strated a proclivity for the retained royalty.43 Furthermore, the courts have
in cases involving solid minerals been inclined to find added duties owing
from the lessee to the royalty owner." The policy reasons underlying the
implication of contractual terms in solid mineral leases do not, however,
parallel those surrounding oil and gas leases. Though the inequality of
bargaining power45 for the lessor of the solid mineral lease is arguably as
great as that for the oil and gas landowner, even-handedness for that same
coal, metal ore surface owner is enhanced by the fact that speculation is
diminished. Although the deposit's existence is more readily ascertainable
than that of the oil or gas reservoir, the empirically predicted profitability of
extraction may, however, be equivalent to oil and gas. Moreover, the
locational stability of solid minerals, as opposed to the migratory nature of
oil and gas, weighs against the issue of first-possessor protection from
drainage. In fact, tort liability in trespass or conversion, with proof more
easily made, may afford just as good protection for the solid mineral land-
owner as any remedy for breach of an implied condition.
The Implied-in-Fact, Implied-in-Law Distinction. Courts have not been
content to confine themselves to the letter of the particular lease in cases
dealing with solid minerals,46 but have instead spoken in terms of reasonable
inferences and of the parties' intentions.47 Thus, if an amplification upon the
solid mineral doctrine of implied covenants has, in fact, carried those
principles into the concurrently developing oil and gas law, the methodology
common to each has been the interpretation of the lease contracts." This
exact methodology, whether the lease involves oil, gas, or solid minerals,
has generated pithy academic controversy.
For purposes of determining the legal reasoning at the foundation of a
court's decision to imply a covenant, two analyses have gained pre-emi-
nence: the implied-in-fact approach and the implied-in-law scheme.49 The
41. 3 THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL LAW FOUNDATION, supra note 39, § 16.1.
42. See notes 7, 8 supra and accompanying text.
43. See 3 THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL LAW FOUNDATION, supra note 39, § 16.57.
44. See, e.g., Mendota Coal & Coke Co. v. Eastern Ry. & Lumber Co., 53 F.2d 77 (9th Cir.
1931) (implied covenant to develop coal mine); Pritchard v. McLeod, 205 F. 24 (9th Cir. 1913)
(implied duty to work and develop gold mine); Freeport Sulphur Co. v. American Sulphur
Royalty Co., 117 Tex. 439, 6 S.W.2d 1039 (1928) (implied covenants of diligent and reasonable
development and operation of sulphur mines); Benavides v. Hunt, 79 Tex. 383, 15 S.W. 3%
(1891) (implied covenant to operate coal mine); Union Sulphur Co. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
42 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1931, writ ref'd) (implied covenants of exploration,
development, and production of sulphur mine); Lassig v. Cahill, 41 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1931, writ ref'd) (implied covenant reasonably to develop stone quarry). See
generally 2 W. SUMMERS, supra note 7, § 395 (perm. ed. 1959); 58 C.J.S. Mines & Minerals §
183 (1948).
45. See notes 23-24 supra and accompanying text.
46. See notes 38-44 supra and accompanying text.
47. See cases cited in note 44 supra.
48. Since the policy reasons for implying covenants in oil and gas leases and in solid
mineral leases do not closely coincide, any justification for an at-law implication of covenants is
tenuous.
49. See M. MERRILL, supra note 6, § 220, at 460-64; 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra
note 1, § 803, at 16-18; Walker, The Nature of the Property Interests Created by an Oil and Gas
Lease in Texas, 11 TEXAS L. REV. 399 (1933).
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scope and nature of the methods have not been as carefully chronicled as
have the polemics. Generally, however, a covenant is said to be implied in
fact if it derives existence from the written agreement and circumstances
surrounding its execution." On the other hand, implied-in-law provisions are
the consequences of a court's interest in promoting fairness, justice, and
equity. 5 1
Professor Merrill, arguing for the implied-in-law faction, 52 cites language
of the Supreme Court of the United States as supportive of the contention
that covenants are implied from the relation of the parties and the object of
the lease. 3 Merrill next turns for support to an Eighth Circuit opinion, which
contained language to the effect that the implication of oil and gas covenants
was not dependent solely upon the terms of the contract, but arose at
common law.54 Substantially on the basis of these opinions, Merrill con-
cludes that no court had implied a covenant by reason of its having been
assented to by the contracting parties or contemplated by them during
negotiations. 5
In 1940, Professor Merrill's conclusion, though misleading, was by no
means inexact. On the other hand, when Professor Walker was published in
1933,56 in anticipation of the line of authority which would be developed
after Merrill's first printing in 1940, he had only the solid mineral cases 57
from which to draw. Nonetheless, his analysis proved persuasive for the
Supreme Court of Texas.5 That court, in an oil and gas context, found the
implied-in-law, fair-and-just approach uncompelling.59 Instead, the Texas
Supreme Court adopted the implied-in-fact basis for the implication of
covenants and, in so doing, emphasized the controlling importance of the
parties' intentions as discerned from the circumstances surrounding the
negotiations .60
Neither theory is, however, without its difficulties. Foremost among the
problems for the implied-in-law approach is the time-hallowed catch-phrase,
"the court can not make the contract for the parties." 61 Prime among the
50. See Walker, supra note 49, at 404.
51. See 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 1, § 803, at 14.5.
52. See M. MERRILL, supra note 6, § 220, at 461-62.
53. See Sauder v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 292 U.S. 272, 279 (1934).
54. See Hamilton v. Empire Gas & Fuel Co., 297 F. 422 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 266 U.S.
607 (1924).
55. See M. MERRILL, supra note 6, § 220, at 463-64. See also Millette v. Phillips Petroleum
Co., 209 Miss. 687, 48 So. 2d 344 (1950) (the court found a fundamental principle based in equity
and in policy that the lessor is protected against unreasonable loss of his mineral resources).
56. See Walker, supra note 49, at 404.
57. See note 44 supra.
58. See Danciger Oil & Ref. Co. v. Powell, 137 Tex. 484, 154 S.W.2d 632 (1941).
59. Id. at 490, 154 S.W.2d at 635.
60. The Supreme Court of Texas couched its holding in these terms:
It is not enough to say that an implied covenant is necessary in order to make the
contract fair, or that without such a covenant it would be improvident or
unwise, or that the contract would operate unjustly . . . . [C]ovenants will be
implied in fact when necessary to give effect to the actual intention of the
parties as reflected by the contract or conveyance as construed in its entirety in
the light of the circumstances under which it was made and the purposes sought
to be accomplished thereby.
Id. (emphasis added).
61. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
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insufficiencies of the implied-in-fact perspective is its assumption that the
parties actually intended the covenants to be part of the lease.62 The prece-
dential value of the respective implied-in-fact or implied-in-law analyses
thus lapses outside their respective jurisdictions.63 The argument may be
advanced that by restricting the court to the alleged intention of the parties
the chance of misconstruction is reduced.' A more functional approach is
suggested by commentators who have found leeway under both the equity
and the party-intention formulas: a restrictive reading, irrespective of juris-
diction, is made by the court whenever an implied covenant is not desirable;
a more expansive construction awaits the popular covenant.
65
II. IMPLIED COVENANTS ENFORCEABLE BETWEEN ASSIGNORS
AND ASSIGNEES
To this point, attention has focused upon the development of implied
covenants between the lessor and lessee of an oil and gas lease. The
continued vitality of these common law rights and duties in the face of
conservation schemes of restricted production has been the subject of
varied analyses.' The policy objectives have been compelling.67 The com-
peting forces of conservation and demand have come to terms on a schedule
of coexistence." Discussion now turns to the additional problems presented
to the courts and affected parties by assignment of oil and gas leases.69
The implication of covenants of exploration, development, marketing, or
protection has attended the development of the legal principles associated
with oil and gas lease assignments. The difficult questions inherent in
implied promises generally are magnified by the peculiarities of oil and gas
law. The comparatively recent common law formulations with respect to
implied covenants enforceable between the assignor and the assignee of an
62. See M. MERRILL, supra note 6, § 220, at 463.
63. See Millette v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 209 Miss. 687, 48 So. 2d 344 (1950) (implied in
law); Danciger Oil & Ref. Co. v. Powell, 137 Tex. 484, 154 S.W.2d 632 (1941) (implied in fact).
For a discussion of these cases and their theories see notes 49-62 supra and accompanying text.
64. See 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 1, § 803, at 16.
65. Id. at 18. The point, here, is not to condone such an analysis of what the courts are, in
fact, doing; rather, the commentators' approach is offered only as a possible resolution of an
irreconcilable problem.
66. See, e.g., Eberhardt, Effect of Conservation Laws, Rules and Regulations on the Rights
of Lessors, Lessees and Owners of Unleased Mineral Interests, SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUN-
DATION, FIFTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON OIL AND GAS LAW AND TAXATION 125 (1954).
67. See notes 19-29 supra and accompanying text.
68. See Temple v. Continental Oil Co., 182 Kan. 213, 320 P.2d 1039, aff'd on rehearing, 183
Kan. 471, 328 P.2d 358 (1958), where the court rejected the argument that the implied covenant
of development should be abandoned owing to the passage of conservation laws; rather, the
court preferred to balance the interests of the lessor and lessee within the conservation
framework.
69. See generally M. MERRILL, supra note 6, §§ 186-91, at 412-19; 2 H. WILLIAMS & C.
MEYERS, supra note 1, §§ 419-22 (1975 & Supp. 1976); Brooks, Liability of an Oil and Gas
Lessee for Causing Drainage: A Standard for Texas, 51 TEXAS L. REV. 546 (1973); Collins, The
Rights of the Overriding Royalty Owner, 39 J. KAN. B.A. 235 (1970); Martz & Hames, Implied
Rights of Royalty Owners, 30 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 1 (1957); Merrill, Implied Covenants
Between Others than Lessors and Lessees, 27 WASH. U.L.Q. 155 (1941); Walker, supra note 49,
at 450-54; Comment, Liability in Texas for Wrongful Drainage of Oil and Gas, 27 TEXAS L.
REV. 349 (1949); Note, Oil and Gas-Lease Assignments-Assignee's Duty to Protect the
Override, 12 Sw. L.J. 235 (1958); Note, Protection of Assignor's Reserved Overriding Royalty-
Contractual Extension of Overriding Royalty Beyond Term of Lease, 28 TUL. L. REV. 408
(1954); Recent Cases, Oil and Gas, 16 TEXAS L. REV. 594 (1938).
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oil and gas lease7" have been sporadic and conflicting.7 An illustrative
framework is provided by considering the legal evolution of the assignor-
assignee implied covenants in Texas. Policy reasons, if sound, will support
similar adoption in jurisdictions which have not yet ruled on the issue.
A. Precedent
Texas conformed early to the position taken in other jurisdictions by
implying in Emery v. League72 the covenant to use reasonable diligence in
exploration and development. Until recently, however, Texas recognized
that the assignor-assignee relationship is fundamentally different from the
lessor-lessee situation.73
The seminal case in Texas concerning the rights and duties of assignees of
oil and gas leases is Greenwood & Tyrrell v. Helm.74 In Helm the original
lessee of the oil and gas lease assigned to Helm all his rights, title, and
interest. Helm subsequently contracted to assign the lease to defendants in
consideration of $16,000 paid on transfer and $3,200 "to be paid out of the
first oil produced from said lease over and above the royalty reserved to the
original lessors." 75 The terms of the original lease obligated the holder of the
working interest "to make as many attempts, if and as lessee shall desire, to
find oil or gas in paying quantities . ".7.. 6Defendant drilled no producing
wells, and Helm, an assignor with a reserved production payment, sued for
the $3,200.
The narrow holding of the court of civil appeals in Helm was that the
defendant-assignees had not expressly obligated themselves to drill addi-
tional wells, the proceeds from which the assignor's reserved production
payment would be satisfied.77 The court, however, did not confine its ruling
to the facts. Broadly, the court stated that had no express covenants existed,
70. The difficulties surrounding the procurement of oil and gas-for example, speculative-
ness and investment overhead-have compelled adoption of various risk-shifting techniques.
See notes 4-11 supra and accompanying text. Leases of mineral rights emerged. Courts
fashioned implied covenants to consummate the parties' intentions and to effect equity.
Assignment of the lease furnished resource mobility. See note 69 supra. But the implied
covenant doctrine, existing in the lessor-lessee context since Stoddard v. Emery, 128 Pa. 436,
18 A. 339 (1889), has not been generally recognized. See note 73 infra. In-depth jurisdictional
analysis is not here undertaken. General citations to treatises would be at best cumulative since
interstate and federal court decisions on the precise issue of covenants implied in law enforce-
able between the assignor and assignee are nonexistent.
71. The only cases specifically recognizing implied-in-law covenants (other than good
faith-see notes 120-27 infra) between assignors and assignees are Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Taylor, 115 F.2d 726 (5th Cir. 1940), modified on denial of rehearing, 116 F.2d 994 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 313 U.S. 565 (1941); Humphreys Oil Co. v. Tatum, 26 F.2d 882 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 278 U.S. 633 (1928); Bolton v. Coats, 533 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. 1975).
The only other jurisdiction which has been confronted with the issue has rejected it on two
occasions: McNeill v. Peaker, 253 Ark. 747, 488 S.W.2d 706 (1973); Henderson Co. v. Murphy,
189 Ark. 87, 70 S.W.2d 1036 (1934).
72. 72 S.W. 603 (Tex. Civ. App. 1903, writ ref'd).
73. Two commentators have written: "Clearly it has not been established that the owner of
an overriding royalty or oil payment is entitled to the benefit of covenants similar to all of the
covenants normally implied in an oil and gas lease." 2 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note
1, § 420.1, at 350.
74. 264 S.W. 221 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1924, writ ref'd).
75. Id. at 222.
76. Id. at 221.
77. Id. at 223.
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such obligations would have been implied.78 Unanswered by this sweeping
language was the issue of which party, assignor or lessor, was entitled to
enforce the covenants in the event they should be implied. The method by
which the covenant would be implied was then treated. The court chose to
determine the parties' intentions from such circumstances as the nature and
hazards of the undertaking, the justness and reasonableness of the obliga-
tion to be implied, and the consideration paid for the assignment.7 9 This
speculation opened the door for inquiry into the policy justification for
implied covenants between parties other than lessors and lessees. In dictum
the court asserted that an assignor is presumed to know that his assignee, in
the absence of an express agreement, would not have intended to be re-
quired to develop an unproductive territory.8 " The court, in attributing
expertise to the assignor, laid the groundwork for an absolute rejection of
implied covenants enforceable by an assignor against an assignee who has
reserved a nonoperating interest. 81
The next case to build upon Helm was Simms Oil Co. v. Colquitt.a2 The
lessee-plaintiff, in consideration of $7,000 cash and a reserved production
payment for an equal amount, assigned all his rights under two leases to the
defendant-oil company." Under the original leases, an option rested with
the operator either to drill a well within eight months or to make certain
deferred rental payments.' The assignee elected to pay the delay rentals,
8 5
and the assignor sued to recover the production payment for breach of
implied covenants of drilling and development.
In Simms Oil Co. v. Colquitt the court of civil appeals had decided that
covenants to drill and to develop should be implied from the assignment
provisions. 6 The commission of appeals, in its first consideration of the
issue, rejected the argument that any covenant could have been implied
from the terms of the assignment contract.8 7 In approving of the decision in
Helm,"a the court resolved an issue left open in the earlier case, namely, that
the intention of the parties will control the determination of implicit prom-
ises.89 The commission of appeals reasoned that had the parties to the
assignment intended the assignee's right either to drill or to make delay
78. Id. at 222.
79. Id. at 223.
80. Id.
81. Accord, McNeill v. Peaker, 253 Ark. 747, 748, 488 S.W.2d 706, 707 (1973). After
finding no difference between reservation of an oil payment and an overriding royalty, the
Arkansas Supreme Court wrote: "In assignments ... the assignor and assignee are usually
experienced in the oil business and knowledgable [sic] enough to make certain any uncertainty
by inserting provisions which protect the assignor's interests if he deems it necessary." Id.
82. 296 S.W. 491 (Tex. Comm'n App., jdgmt adopted), set for rehearing, 298 S.W. 892
(Tex. Comm'n App. 1927), aff'd on rehearing, 2 S.W.2d 421 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1928, jdgmt
adopted).
83. Simms Oil Co. v. Colquitt, 2% S.W. 491, 492 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927, jdgmt
adopted).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 494.
86. Simms Oil Co. v. Colquitt, 289 S.W. 98, 100 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1926).
87. Simms Oil Co. v. Colquitt, 296 S.W. 491, 492 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927, jdgmt
adopted).
88. See notes 77-80 supra and accompanying text.




rental payments be superseded by a covenant to drill they could easily have
expressly provided for such a covenant.' In light of the consideration paid
and the relative bargaining powers of both parties, the commission of
appeals refused to imply the covenant to drill between the assignor and
assignee.
Ebberts v. Carpenter Production Co., 9 last in the line of cases developing
the dicta of Helm, resolved on its facts the issue of who is entitled to enforce
implied covenants in an assignment context. Lessee-assignor, with lessors
intervening,92 brought suit to rescind two assignments of oil and gas leases.
The assignees, in consideration of the assigned interests, paid $13,300 and
agreed to make $5,000 production payments on each of the two leases.93 At
least one of the assignor's theories for obtaining the equitable remedy of
rescission was the failure of the assignee to develop the leases further and to
protect them from drainage.94
In Ebberts Judge Walker, the proponent of the implied-in-fact theory
which had been adopted previously by the Texas Supreme Court, 95 under-
stood plaintiff's argument to be not that the assignees expressly promised to
develop the leasehold and to protect it from drainage, but that the obliga-
tions were implied under the terms of the original lease. 96 Squarely con-
sidering the issue of whether covenants should be implied, the court con-
cluded that the implied obligations under the lease would run only to the
lessors, and would not run to the lessee-assignor. 97 Moreover, the court of
civil appeals held that in the absence of an express provision that the
assignee would be liable to the assignor for breach of the implied covenants
under the original lease, the assignor could only himself enforce implied
covenants where he remained liable under the original lease.98 Since the
landowners in Ebberts, however, did not attempt to enforce the implied
obligations against either the original lessee or the assignee, 99 no reason
existed for allowing the assignor to recover for the assignee's breach of an
implied covenant. The inevitable conclusion was, therefore, to deny
enforceability by the assignor of the implied covenants to develop and to
off set. 1010
90. Id. at 493. The subsequent affirmation in Simms Oil Co. v. Colquitt, 2 S.W.2d 421 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1928, jdgmt adopted), evidenced a partial retreat from the principles expressed in
the first opinion. The commission of appeals held that no cause of action had "matured." Id. at
422. The viability of such a decree is questionable: the issue had been whether the express
option precluded any implication of a covenant to drill; the commission, in requiring that oil be
produced before a claim for relief could mature, effectively circumvented the question.
91. 256 S.W.2d 601 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1953, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
92. Id. at 604.
93. Id. at 606. Other transfers not pertinent to this discussion were also made by the
parties.
94. Id. at 613.
95. See Danciger Oil & Ref. Co. v. Powell, 137 Tex. 484, 154 S.W.2d 632 (1941). See also
notes 56-60 supra and accompanying text.
96. Ebberts v. Carpenter Prod. Co., 256 S.W.2d 601,613 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1953,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
97. Id. at 613-14.
98. Id.




Thus, the status of Texas common law, as it existed prior to Bolton v.
Coats, '0 was far short of implied covenants running between assignors and
assignees of oil and gas leases. In fact, the legal formula was an amalgam: (1)
express provisions in assignment contracts preclude implication of obliga-
tions; 02 (2) in the event that express terms are not controlling and covenants
must be implied, the intent of the parties, restricted to the reasonable
inferences from the language of the assignment contract, governs; 10 3 and (3)
where the lessor has not sought to enforce implied covenants against the
lessee-assignor who has reserved a nonoperating interest, such implied
covenants are not enforceable by the lessee against his assignee.'
14
In 1975 the Texas Supreme Court, in Bolton v. Coats ,05 abandoned this
line of precedent and blazed a new trail in oil and gas law. In Bolton the
plaintiff-lessee reserved an overriding royalty on an assigned gas lease.
Defendant-assignee paid to the assignor $12,500 in addition to the promised
override payments. Affidavits filed by plaintiff and a geophysical engineer
averred that defendant was exploiting oil for which the assignor was not
receiving royalty payments. Defendant contended in its affidavits that the
Texas Railroad Commission's classification of the wells as gas-producing
precluded collateral attack, and that if oil were being produced, an express
covenant to develop proscribed implication of all other covenants.'" 6 Sum-
mary judgment was entered for the defendant, and the court of civil appeals
affirmed.0 7 The supreme court, however, reversed,'01 holding first that the
suit was not a collateral attack on the Texas Railroad Commission's order
categorizing the wells as gas producing.'O° The order had only established
that oil in excess of one barrel per 100,000 cubic feet of gas should not have
been produced, not that a greater amount was in fact extracted.110 Then, on
an issue cursorily treated in the parties' briefs, the court held that "[ulnless
the assignment provides to the contrary, the assignee of an oil and gas lease
101. 533 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. 1975).
102. Simms Oil Co. v. Colquitt, 2% S.W. 491 (Tex. Comm'n App., jdgmt adopted), set for
rehearing, 298 S.W. 892 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927), aff'd on rehearing, 2 S.W.2d 421 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1928, jdgmt adopted); Greenwood & Tyrrell v. Helm, 264 S.W. 221 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1924, writ ref'd).
103. Simms Oil Co. v. Colquitt, 2% S.W. 491 (Tex. Comm'n App., jdgmt adopted), set for
rehearing, 298 S.W. 892 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927), aff'd on rehearing, 2 S.W.2d 421 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1928, jdgmt adopted); Ebberts v. Carpenter Prod. Co., 256 S.W.2d 601 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Beaumont 1953, writ ref'd n.r.e.). No valid explanation is conceivable for implying
covenants in law in the assignee-assignor context, as was done in Bolton v. Coats, 533 S.W.2d
914, 915 (Tex. 1975), and for adhering to an implied-in-fact theory where the lessee and lessor
are concerned, as in Danciger Oil & Ref. Co. v. Powell, 137 Tex. 484, 154 S.W.2d 632 (1941).
Such contract terms as deferred rentals and cash closing payments are instrumental in deter-
mining the parties' intent.
104. Ebberts v. Carpenter Prod. Co., 256 S.W.2d 601, 613-14 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1953, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The fact that oil payments and not overriding royalties are reserved
should only be significant in terms of the parties' intent. See notes 130-33 infra.
105. 533 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. 1975).
106. See, e.g., Kile v. Amerada Petroleum Corp., 118 Okla. 176, 247 P. 681 (1926); Middle
States Petroleum Corp. v. Messenger, 368 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1963, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
107. Bolton v. Coats, 514 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974).
108. Bolton v. Coats, 533 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. 1975).




impliedly covenants to protect the premises against drainage when the
assignor reserves an overriding royalty."'11
Logical methods, drawing from equity principles," 2 from basic property
and contract tenets," 3 and from fundamental landlord-tenant concepts,"
4
might have been employed as justification for the implication of the coven-
ant against drainage enforceable against the assignee. Instead, the court
chose to rely upon a Fifth Circuit case," 5 an analogy to a Texas case," 6 and
a citation to secondary authority." 7 Since the court opted in favor of a stare
decisis approach, the only precedents of value on matters of local law are
Texas decisions. "' Careful consideration of the relevant authorities, howev-
er, should have led to a contrary conclusion.
With respect to the equitable theory of fiduciary relationships, several
jurisdictions have implied a duty of fair dealing in situations where an
assignor, upon assignment, has reserved a nonoperating interest in the
leasehold." 9 The objective of this good-faith, fair-dealing covenant is to
restrain the assignee from extinguishing the assignor's retained interest by
allowing the lease to lapse or by re-leasing from the landowner. The signifi-
cance of these cases is, however, limited primarily to the good-faith coven-
ant itself because of the factual issues involved. Moreover, the relevance of
this line of precedent does not extend to the more important implied coven-
ants of exploration, development, marketing, protection, etc., except in-
sofar as all are part of the encompassing prudent-operator standard. 2 ' The
eagerness of a court sitting in equity to rectify injustice in the absence of an
adequate remedy at law underpins the analyses in all these cases. Whether
the lease involves government property,' dual interest,' or joint ven-
ture, "'23 the key phrases have been "trust and confidence" or "fiduciary
relationship." Importantly, such a fiduciary relationship does not arise
solely upon assignment of the working interest and reservation of a
nonoperating interest. 24 Specific fact patterns evoking the good-faith
111. Id.
112. See notes 119-25 infra and accompanying text.
113. See notes 126-34 infra and accompanying text.
114. See notes 135-43 infra and accompanying text.
115. The court rested its holding on Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Taylor, 115 F.2d 726 (5th Cir.
1940), modified on denial of rehearing, 116 F.2d 994 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 565 (1941).
Bolton v. Coats, 533 S.W.2d 914, 916 (Tex. 1975).
116. The analogy is to Cole Petroleum Co. v. United States Gas & Oil Co., 121 Tex. 59, 41
S.W.2d 414 (1931). Bolton v. Coats, 533 S.W.2d 914, 916 (Tex. 1975).
117. The sources referenced were M. MERRILL, supra note 6, § 188, at 416-18; 3 W.
SUMMERS, supra note 7, § 554, at 652-59. Bolton v. Coats, 533 S.W.2d 914,916-17 (Tex. 1975).
118. See Wichita Royalty Co. v. City Nat'l Bank, 306 U.S. 103, 109 (1939); Galveston H. &
S.A. Ry. v. Wells, 121 Tex. 310, 324, 50 S.W.2d 247, 252 (1932).
119. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. McCormick, 211 F.2d 361, 364 (10th Cir. 1954) (the
court ruled that "[q]uite apart from any stipulations in the lease, the law implies a duty on the
part of the assignee to exercise good faith with respect to the assignor's retained interest in the
lease"). See also La Laguna Ranch Co. v. Dodge, 18 Cal; 2d 132, 114 P.2d 351 (1941); Matthews
v. Ramsey-Lloyd Oil Co., 121 Kan. 75, 245 P. 1064 (1926); Whitten v. Daws, 226 Miss. 96, 83
So. 2d 744 (1955); Rees v. Briscoe, 315 P.2d 758 (Okla. 1957); Probst v. Hughes, 143 Okla. 11,
286 P. 875 (1930).
120. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
121. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. McCormick, 211 F.2d 361 (10th Cir. 1954).
122. Matthews v. Ramsey-Lloyd Oil Co., 121 Kan. 75, 245 P. 1064 (1926).
123. Rees v. Briscoe, 315 P.2d 758 (Okla. 1957).
124. See Note, Oil and Gas-Lease Assignments-Assignee's Duty to Protect the Override,
12 Sw. L.J. 235, 236 (1958).
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covenant are not discernible. In particular, Texas, though not discounting
the possibility of imposing a constructive trust on a renewal lease, has been
slow to find the appropriate fact situation.25
Landlord-tenant notions of privity constitute the second alternative
theory for implication of assignor-assignee covenants. In the negotiated
lease situation, two kinds of privity exist between the lessee and lessor:
privity of estate and privity of contract. Assignment of the lease by the
tenant severs the privity of estate since the right of possession is essential to
its existence; once the right to possess vests in the assignee, however,
privity of estate originates between the assignee and the lessor. Absent an
express or implied novation, the assignor, because of privity of contract,
remains liable to the lessor on the lease covenants. Unless the assignee
assumes these contractual obligations, he is legally bound to perform only
the covenants which run with the land. As a general rule, a covenant runs
with the land if it touches and concerns the land. For breach of any express
or touching-and-concerning covenant, the assignee in possession is primari-
ly liable to the lessor; to the extent that he must pay, the assignor, who is
secondarily responsible, has a right of contribution or indemnification
against the assignee. 2 6 Though real property principles have not been adopt-
ed wholesale into oil and gas law, influence has been inevitable.'27 The
lessor, whether for reasons of privity of estate or independence of contract,
has been held entitled to recover damages from the assignee following the
latter's breach of an express or implied covenant. 2 ' The enforcement of
covenants in an oil and gas lease by the assignor, however, has typically
depended solely upon the terms of the assignment contract.'29 A valid
argument may be made that the assignor who reserves an overriding royalty
or oil payment should be able to enforce covenants running with the land
owing to a facsimile privity of estate. The phrase "overriding royalty" has
generally referred to a fixed percentage of gross production carved from the
working interest, but not diminished by operating expenses.' 3' An oil pay-
ment, like the overriding royalty, is carved from the lessee's share of the oil,
125. See Sunac Petroleum Corp. v. Parkes, 416 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. 1%7) (court denied
reinstatement of overriding royalty where lessee took new lease after expiration of first);
Wagner v. Sheets & Walton Drilling Co., 359 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1%2, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (no fiduciary relationship found where lease had expired before assignee renewed
it). See also Gordon v. Empire Gas & Fuel Co., 63 F.2d 487 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 289 U.S.
751 (1933) (no trust relation prevents assignee from acquiring independent rights after lease
expires).
126. For a general treatment of the preceding points see L. JONES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF LANDLORD AND TENANT § 455-456, 462 (1906); 3A G. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE
MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY §§ 1215-1216, 1224 (1959).
127. See generally 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 1, § 842.3, at 271, § 845.6, at
348; Walker, supra note 49, at 450-54; Warren, Transfer of the Oil and Gas Lessee's Interest, 34
TEXAS L. REV. 386, 392 (1956).
128. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Taylor, 115 F.2d 726 (5th Cir. 1940), modified on
denial of rehearing, 116 F.2d 994 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 565 (1941) (implied covenant
against drainage); Dixon v. Anadarko Prod. Co., 505 P.2d 1394 (Okla. 1973) (implied covenant
against drainage); W.T. Waggoner Estate v. Sigler Oil Co., 118 Tex. 509, 19 S.W.2d 27 (1929)
(implied covenant to develop); Reeves v. Republic Prod. Co., 177 S.W.2d 1011 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Galveston 1944, writ ref'd w.o.m.) (implied covenant to develop).
129. See Owens v. O'Donohoe, 280 S.W. 842 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1926, no writ);
Greenwood & Tyrrell v. Helm, 264 S.W. 221 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1924, writ ref'd).
130. See MacDonald v. Follett, 142 Tex. 616, 180 S.W.2d 334 (1944); Tennant v. Dunn, 130
Tex. 285, 110 S.W.2d 53 (1937).
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the working interest; it differs, however, from the overriding royalty in that
it expires whenever the payee receives the agreed amount for his interest.' 3'
Oil and gas in place have been characterized as real property, subject to
absolute ownership in Texas.1 2 Overriding royalties and oil payments have
also been deemed interests in land.' 33 Thus, by reserving a part of the oil and
gas in place, the lessee has retained an interest in real property which would,
in theory, give rise to a right to enforce against the assignee covenants other
than those linked to the assignment contract. In practice, none of the courts
implying covenants between assignors and assignees has so concluded. 1
34
. Property concepts of sublease and partial assignment furnish the third
possible theory for implying covenants in assigned leases.' 35 At one time, it
was thought that the peculiarities of Texas oil and gas law precluded a
distinction between subleases and assignments: "A mineral lease is the
conveyance of a determinable fee interest in land." 36 An oil and gas "lease"
was, therefore, a category in itself.33 Nevertheless, authority recognizing
the sublease-assignment distinction does exist in Texas. In Hamblen v.
Placid Oil Co. 3' the court of appeals ruled that the assignor's reservation of
an overriding royalty technically created a sublease and not an assign-
ment.'39 The effect of this finding is to destroy any basis for privity of estate
between the assignee and the original lessor."4 Thus, if a covenant running
with the land is to be enforced, the assignor must do so, or the right is lost.
A second repercussion of the sublease classification involves privity of
contract and the implied-in-law, implied-in-fact distinction.' 4 ' Commen-
tators have asserted that the assignor of a lease will remain liable for
covenants implied in fact, i.e., those intended by the parties to be a part of
the agreement, because of contract privity. 42 With respect to the implied-in-
fact, equitable covenant, however, the assignor, upon assignment, is dis-
charged from responsibility to the lessor because neither privity of estate
nor of contract exists. Since the assignor will not be accountable to the
original lessor for the assignee's breach of a covenant implied in law, justice
is not served by implying a covenant enforceable between the assignor and
the assignee. Texas, an implied-in-fact jurisdiction, 43 should on policy
131. See Standard Oil Co. v. Marshall, 265 F.2d 46 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 915
(1959). See also 43 TEX. JUR. 2d Oil & Gas § 383 (1963).
132. See 42 TEX. JUR. 2d Oil & Gas § 5 (1963).
133. See Pich v. Lankford, 157 Tex. 335, 302 S.W.2d 645 (1957); Eternal Cemetery Corp. v.
Tammen, 324 S.W.2d 562 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
134. See note 71 supra.
135. See generally E. BROWN, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS LEASES § 11.04 (1958); R. HEMING-
WAY, supra note 30, at 455; M. MERRILL, supra note 6, § 182, at 401-05; 2 H. WILLIAMS & C.
MEYERS, supra note 1, §§ 409-410, at 282-303; Merrill, The Partial Assignee-Done in Oil, 20
TEXAS L. REV. 298 (1942).
136. Parker v. Standard Oil Co., 250 S.W.2d 671, 680 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1952, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (emphasis added).
137. See Shell Oil Co. v. Howth, 138 Tex. 357, 367, 159 S.W.2d 483, 490 (1942).
138. 279 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1955), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Mecom
v. Hamblen, 155 Tex. 406, 289 S.W.2d 553 (1956).
139. 279 S.W.2d at 131.
140. See, e.g., Davis v. Vidal, 105 Tex. 444, 151 S.W. 290 (1912); Gray v. Taylor, 138
S.W.2d 891 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1940, writ dism'd jdgmt cor.).
141. See text accompanying notes 49-65 supra.
142. See Walker, supra note 49, at 402; Warren, supra note 129, at 400.
143. See Danciger Oil & Ref. Co. v. Powell, 137 Tex. 484, 490, 154 S.W.2d 632, 635 (1941).
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grounds, in the absence of fraud, adhere to the assignment agreement's
terms. The assignor who continues to be liable to the lessor on the implied
contractual terms is not without remedy, particularly in instances where an
express term of the assignment requires the assignee's indemnification or
contribution. The sublessee, on the other hand, is responsible only to the
sublessor, since only between them do the privities of both estate and
contract exist. The response to this theory is the same as that for the above
interest-in-hand argument. The cases implying covenants between the assig-
nor and the assignee have not turned on a sublease-assignment distinction,
even assuming such a distinction is recognized in Texas.
The supreme court in Bolton, however, settled upon a stare decisis
approach for the implication of covenants enforceable between assignors
and assignees. The primary precedent upon which the supreme court relied
was Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Taylor.'" In Taylor the lessee, who owned an
overriding royalty interest, joined with the lessor in suing the assignee of an
oil and gas lease for breach of the implied covenant to offset. The Fifth
Circuit, in its opinion on rehearing, correctly acknowledged that Texas law
was controlling. 45 The court, however, erred in its conclusion as to the then
status of implied covenants in Texas enforceable between the assignor and
the assignee and cited no Texas authority as a basis for the holding. 46
Conceding the existence of the offset covenant between the original lessor
and the assignee, the court applied "the same principle to the assignor and
assignee" because "it seems entirely reasonable to impose a similar du-
ty.', 47 The court further assumed that the decision to imply the offset
covenant, enforceable between the assignor and assignee, could prejudice
no one.' The Fifth Circuit justified this conclusion of no-prejudice on two
bases. First, the court reasoned that the burden of offsetting implied under
the original lease in favor of the lessor would not be increased by making the
implied covenant to protect against drainage enforceable between the assig-
nor and assignee.'49 Secondly, the court claimed that the reserved royalty
under the assignment would be radically devalued if the assignor were
deprived of his only enforcement privilege, that of a damages action against
the assignee for breach of the implied covenant to offset. 50
The Fifth Circuit, however, was incomplete in its analysis. Someone, the
assignee, was prejudiced. For example, since the duty to offset exists only
where the owner of the working interest may do so at a reasonable profit,
the assignee need only offset in instances where he could realize a profit
after all operating expenses and all royalties, as increased by the assignor's
reserved overriding royalty, had been paid.' 5 ' Therefore, before having
implied the covenant against drainage, the courts in Taylor and Bolton
144. 115 F.2d 726 (5th Cir. 1940), modified on denial of rehearing, 116 F.2d 994 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 313 U.S. 565 (1941).
145. 116 F.2d at 995.
146. Id.




151. See 2 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 1, § 420.1, at 350-51.
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should have considered the effect that the additional overriding royalty
would have had upon the profitability of offsetting.
Finally, the argument that the Texas Supreme Court is bound by the Fifth
Circuit's interpretation of state law is without merit.'52 It might just as well
be contended that the Arkansas decisions of McNeill v. Peaker153 and of
Henderson Co. v. Murphy'5 4 were controlling. Furthermore, the very lan-
guage of the Taylor opinion refutes applicability to Bolton. For example,
the Fifth Circuit first found that the implied covenant against drainage
extended to the lessor who had joined in the suit. 155 Second, the assignee in
Bolton had, in addition to the overriding royalty, agreed to pay $12,500,56
whereas in Taylor the sole consideration which the assignee had obligated
himself to pay was the overriding royalty. 57
The second decision upon which the supreme court in Bolton based the
implication of the covenant to offset was that of Cole Petroleum Co. v.
United States Gas & Oil Co. 158 In Cole, a trespass to try title suit between
assignees of a common assignor, the plaintiff was permitted to enforce an
express assignment clause that reasonable diligence be employed in market-
ing the gas produced. For failure to perform any assignment covenant,
plaintiff's agreement with the assignor-lessee required forfeiture. 59 The
supreme court held that plaintiff had breached the express marketing provi-
sion and that forfeiture was in order."6 By way of dictum, however, the
court concluded that, even if the assignment terms had not expressly re-
quired the assignee to use reasonable diligence in marketing the gas pro-
duced from the wells, such a covenant would nonetheless have been im-
plied.' 6' The reason for the implication, however, was not merely equity, but
rather was limited by the contractual terms as they evidenced the parties'
intent.62 Reliance upon Cole should therefore have compelled the supreme
court in Bolton to consider the intent of both the assignor and the assignee
before concluding that an enforceable covenant to protect against drainage
should be implied.
With Taylor inapplicable under principles of federalism,'63 and with Cole
distinguishable on facts and dictum," 6 the supreme court's implied-in-law
covenant to protect against drainage can only be considered as founded
upon secondary authority.'65 The court accurately labeled Professor Mer-
152. See Wichita Royalty Co. v. City Nat'l Bank, 306 U.S. 103, 109 (1939); Galveston H. &
S.A. Ry. v. Wells, 121 Tex. 310, 324, 50 S.W.2d 247, 252 (1932).
153. 253 Ark. 747, 488 S.W.2d 706 (1973).
154. 189 Ark. 87, 70 S.W.2d 1036 (1934).
155. 115 F.2d at 727-28.
156. 533 S.W.2d at 915.
157. 115 F.2d at 727.
158. 121 Tex. 59, 41 S.W.2d 414 (1931).
159. Id. at 61, 41 S.W.2d at 415.
160. Id. at 66, 41 S.W.2d at 417.
161. Id. at 64, 41 S.W.2d at 416.
162. Id. at 66, 41 S.W.2d at 417.
163. See note 152 supra and accompanying text.
164. See notes 161, 162 supra and accompanying text.
165. See Bolton v. Coats, 533 S.W.2d 914, 916-17 (Tex. 1975). The secondary authorities




rill's volume as supportive of the proposition that an assignor who reserves
an overriding royalty interest in an oil and gas lease should be capable of
enforcing implied covenants against the assignee.1" The supreme court's
citation to Professor Summers' treatise is, however, misplaced since it
contains no language supportive of the same proposition.'67
The historical evolution of Texas common law as demonstrated by Green-
wood & Tyrrell v. Helm, " Simms Oil Co. v. Colquitt, '69 Cole Petroleum Co.
v. United States Gas & Oil Co., 170 and Ebberts v. Carpenter Production
Co., 7' aligned Texas with jurisdictions which had adopted the implied-in-
fact method.' 72 This method, however, stops far short of implying covenants
enforceable between assignors and assignees of oil and gas leases.173
Moreover, in terms of the precedent relied upon by the court in reaching its
result,' 74 the proper analysis in Bolton would have been to consider profita-
bility, the lessor's having joined in the suit to enforce the implied covenants
against the assignee, the overriding royalty serving as the sole consideration
of the assignment, and the assignor's alternative means of enforcement.1 75
None of these factual and legal analyses were, however, undertaken in
Bolton. 176 In the face of precedent, Bolton is therefore an aberration. It
extended the law of oil and gas two steps beyond its then-existing status;
first, in its implied-in-law theory of implication; secondly, in its conjuring of
covenants, from a source other than the assignment contract and the rea-
sonable inferences therefrom, enforceable between an assignor and assig-
nee. If, therefore, Bolton is to have any vitality, it must originate in policy.
B. Policy
Although it has been written that the reservation of a nonoperating inter-
est alone gives rise to the need to imply covenants,7  other considerations
must underlie the implication of conditions. 7 1 Commentators have dis-
agreed as to whether the same policy reasons justify the principle of implied
covenants in both the lessor-lessee and the assignor-assignee contexts.7
Careful scrutiny does not, however, confirm this thesis. The argument that
implied terms are necessary to evoke relative equality of bargaining power
between the lessor and lessee 80 loses impetus once it is applied to the parties
166. See M. MERRILL, supra note 6, § 188, at 416-18.
167. See 3 W. SUMMERS, supra note 7, § 554, at 652-59.
168. 264 S.W. 221 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1924, writ ref'd).
169. 2% S.W. 491 (Tex. Comm'n App., jdgmt adopted), set for rehearing, 298 S.W. 892
(Tex. Comm'n App. 1927), aff'd on rehearing, 2 S.W.2d 421 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1928, jdgmt
adopted).
170. 121 Tex. 59, 41 S.W.2d 414 (1931).
171. 256 S.W.2d 601 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1953, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
172. See notes 49-65 supra and accompanying text.
173. See note 71 supra.
174. The court relied primarily upon Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Taylor, 115 F.2d 726 (5th Cir.
1940), modified on denial of rehearing, 116 F.2d 994 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 565 (1941).
175. See notes 144-57 supra and accompanying text.
176. 533 S.W.2d 914, 915-16 (Tex. 1975).
177. "[Wlhere the sole compensation to the landlord is a share of what is produced, there is
always an implied covenant for diligent search and operation." Huggins v. Daley, 99 F. 606, 609
(4th Cir. 1900).
178. See 5 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 1, § 801, at 1-2.
179. See generally M. MERRILL, supra note 6, § 179, at 396-98; 3 W. SUMMERS, supra note 7,
§ 554; Merrill, Implied Covenants Between Others Than Lessors and Lessees, 27 WASH. U.L.Q.
155, 162-65 (1942); Walker, supra note 49, at 450-54; 43 TEX. JUR. 2d Oil & Gas § 418 (1963).
180. See notes 20-24 supra and accompanying text.
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of an assignment agreement. Assignors and assignees of oil and gas leases
are presumed 181 to have acquired a degree of sophistication alien to the
traditional surface owner's aptitude.8 2 Another policy objective generally at
odds with the implication of oil and gas covenants through the operation of
the law is peculiar to Texas."8 3 Integral to this state's legal system is the
conceit that controversy is best resolved by a panel of peers. Categorically
implying additional obligations, however, circumscribes the right of an oil
and gas assignment, or lease, litigant to have a significant issue submitted to
the jury.' 8 4
Finally, an alternative rationale for the evolution of implied lease cove-
nants has been to give effect to the express terms of the agreement. For
example, recognizing the peculiar properties of oil and gas, the courts have
undertaken to impose a flexible framework, the implied covenant doctrine,
within which the parties may operate.8 5 In Bolton, however, the court
generated an assignee's dilemma.8 6 By requiring the implication of the
offset covenant in favor of an assignor who reserves an overriding royalty,
unless the assignment provides otherwise,8 7 the court has effectively com-
manded the assignee to account for every contingency. The resultant explic-
itness militates against operating flexibility, indispensable under the original
lease, evanescent in assignment. The equality of bargaining power thought
to distinguish the assignor-assignee relationship is consequently displaced in
the assignor's favor.
The cursory treatment that the Texas Supreme Court afforded the com-
plicated issue of implied covenants between assignors and assignees is
unfortunate, given the active function of precedent in a common-law sys-
tem. Bolton v. Coats, aberrant in precedent and policy, has expanded the
scope of an assignee's duties beyond those of the lessee into whose shoes he
is said to have stepped.' If a higher standard is to be imposed upon the
assignee in instances where a nonoperating interest has been reserved by an
assignor, more than mere lip-service should be given to the reasonableness,
a jury issue, of the assignee's conduct.8 9 Irrespective of whether the right or
duty analysis came first,' 90 the creation of a legal remedy for the assignor of
an oil and gas lease would more equitably and reasonably depend upon the
availability of alternative methods of redress.' 9' Since, however, the assign-
181. See notes 80, 89 supra and accompanying text.
182. See notes 20-24, 80, 89 supra and accompanying text.
183. The court in Bolton v. Coats, 533 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. 1975), considered only whether the
assignor's affidavits had created a genuine issue as to any material fact. Since no law actually
existed to entitle either party to the summary judgments sought, the court was explicitly
compelled to hold as a matter of law that covenants could and should be implied between
assignors and assignees of oil and gas leases.
184. See Owens v. O'Donohoe, 280 S.W. 842 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1926, no writ).
185. See notes 25-27 supra and accompanying text.
186. See Bolton v. Coats, 533 S.W.2d 914, 915 (Tex. 1975).
187. Id. In Bolton no provision was made for an offset covenant.
188. See Greenwood & Tyrrell v. Helm, 264 S.W. 221, 222 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1924, writ ref'd).
189. The covenant to protect against drainage will only be implied in instances where a
reasonable profit would be returned over the drilling, equipping, and producing expenses; these
costs of production include both the lessor's and the assignor's royalties. See 2 H. WILLIAMS &
C. MEYERS, supra note 69, § 420.1, at 350-51.
190. See W. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 35-64 (1964).
191. See note 150 supra and accompanying text.
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or, subject to an additional burden of proving profitability inclusive of the
royalty rights of the original lessor, usually receives the benefit of explicit
and implicit covenants between the assignee and the lessor, no pervasive
need exists to make these same covenants enforceable between the assignor
and assignee. To the extent that the lessor's covenants motivate action on
the assignee's part, no further impetus is furnished by enabling the assignor
to kindle performance or to recover for damages. It is submitted, therefore,
that the assignor of an oil and gas lease should be allowed to enforce an
implied covenant only where the lessor has joined as a plaintiff in an action
against the breaching assignee or where the lessor has assigned his cause of
action to the assignor. Adjudication of that right will depend upon case-by-
case factual analysis, not on across-the-board remedial access.
III. CONCLUSION
The development of oil and gas law has attended, for the most part, the
correlative progression in the sciences and techniques of the minerals'
production. Legal principles have emerged when the need was recognized.
In general, such rules of law were the product of reasoned evolution, not of
thoughtless exigency. Irony is not a concept confined to the ephemeral. Its
applicability cuts across the metaphysical to the pragmatic, across the liter-
ary to the legalistic: for among the products of reasoned evolution is the
doctrine of implied lessor-lessee covenants, and among those of thoughtless
exigency rests the premise of conjured assignor-assignee conditions.
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